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Abstract
The smart card based authentication schemes are designed and developed to
ensure secure and authorized communication between remote user and the server.
In recent times, many smart card based authentication schemes for the telecare
medical information systems (TMIS) have been presented. In this article, we briefly
discuss some of the recently published smart card based authentication schemes for
TMIS and try to show why efficient login and password change phases are required.
In other word, the study demonstrates how inefficient password change phase leads
to denial of server attack and how inefficient login phase increase the communication
and computation overhead and decrease the performance of the system.
keywords: Telecare medical information system; Smart card; Password based authenti-
cation; Login phase; Password change phase.
1 Introduction
User-friendly, omnipresence and low cost of internet technology, facilitates flexible online
services in E medicine in which a user can access the remote services at any instant
from anywhere. One of service in C-medicine is telemedicine, which has been brought
to patients’ home through the telecare medical information system (TMIS). In TMIS,
medical server maintains the electronic medical records (EMRs) of registered users and
facilitates various services to the users, health educators, physicians, hospitals, care-givers,
public health organizations and home-care service providers.
In Telecare system a user access the server via public channel while the adversary may
have full control over the public channel and so he can eavesdropped, intercept, record,
modify, delete, and replay the message broadcasting via public channel [19]. This cause
data privacy and security threat in the deployment of TMIS.
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The smart card based protocols enable the health-care delivery services door to door by
employing information and communication technologies [7, 8, 12]. TMIS has the capability
to reduce the social and medical expenses. It also improves the quality of medical services
quality and efficiency. It is regarded as an efficient, economical and time saving alternative
compare to traditional clinical service [11, 6, 13]. However, the privacy and security
issues are rising in TMIS that related to the security of transmitted data and the rights
of patients to understand and control the use of their presentational health records. To
ensure security and privacy during information transmission via public channel, the smart
card based anonymous remote user authentication schemes are generally adopted. In
general, smart card based authentication faces various attacks, a few are, stolen smart
card attack, password guessing attack and insider attack [1].
Recently, a number of password based schemes presented for TMIS [3, 5, 8, 14, 16,
17, 18, 21, 20]. In 2010, Wu et al. [17] presented an efficient authentication scheme for
TMIS. Their scheme is better than the previously proposed schemes for low computing
devices by adding pre-computing phase. In pre-computing phase, user performs expo-
nential operation and then stores the calculated values into the storage device, such that
a user can extract these value from the device whenever required. However, Debiao et
al. [5] demonstrated that Wu et al.’s scheme fails to resist the impersonation attack to
the insider attack. They also introduced an enhanced scheme and claimed that their pro-
posed scheme eliminates the drawbacks of Wu et al.’s scheme and performs better than
Wu et al.’s scheme. They also claimed that their scheme is more appropriate for low
power mobile devices for TMIS. In 2012, Wei et al. [16] identified that both Wu et al.’s
and Debiao et al.’s schemes are inefficient to meet two-factor authentication. In general,
an efficient smart card based password authentication scheme should support two-factor
authentication. They also presented an improved smart card based authentication scheme
for TMIS and claimed that the improved scheme is efficient and achieved two-factor au-
thentication. However, Zhu [21] demonstrated that Wei et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to
off-line password guessing attack using stolen smart card. He also presented an improved
scheme for TMIS and claimed that his scheme could overcome the weaknesses of Wei et
al.’s scheme. Recently, Lee and Liu [8] showed that Zhu’s scheme does not resist parallel
session attacks and introduced an improved scheme. They claimed that their scheme
provides secure and efficient solution for telecare medical information system.
In recent time Chen et al. [3] also presented an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based
authentication scheme for TMIS. In 2013, Lin [10] demonstrated that in Chen et al’s
scheme, user identity is compromised under the dictionary attack and password can be
derived with the stolen smart card. Cao and Zhai [2] demonstrated that Chen et al’s
scheme is vulnerable to an off-line identity guessing attack, an off-line password guessing
attack, and an undetectable on-line password guessing attack when user’s smart card is
stolen. They also presented an improved scheme for TIMS. Xie et al. [18] also pointed out
the weaknesses of Chen et al.’s scheme and presented an improved scheme for TIMS. Re-
cently, Xu et al. [20] introduced ECC based authentication scheme for Telecare Medicine
Information Systems. Most of the existing schemes for TMIS have lack of input verifying
condition which makes these schemes inefficient. In this article, we show that recently
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presented authentication schemes [8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 20] fail to provide efficient login and
password change phase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents the brief review of
Wei et al.’s scheme. Section 4 points out the flaws in login and password change phase
of Wei et al.’s scheme. Section 5 & 6 briefly discuss the Zhu’s scheme and show their
weaknesses. Section 7 presents the brief review of Lee Liu’s scheme and the analysis is
presented in Section 8. Section 9 presents the brief review of Lin’s scheme. Section 10
points out the drawbacks of inefficient login and password change phase of Lin’s scheme.
Section 11 presents the brief review of Cao and Zhai’s scheme. Section 12 points out the
weakness of Cao and Zhai’s scheme. A brief review of the Xie et al.’s scheme is given in
Section 13 and scheme loop holes are presented in Section 14. Section 15 presents the
brief review of Xu et al.’s scheme. Section 10 points out the drawbacks of inefficient login
and password change phase of Xu et al.’s scheme. The attribute comparison is presented
in Section 17. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 18.
2 Notations
Table 1: Meaning of symbols that are used in this article
Notation Descryption
U User/paitient
S A trustworthy medical server
p, q Two large primes
N Product of p and q
ZN Ring of integers modulo N
e Public key of S
d Master secret key of S
E Attacker/adversary
SC Smart Card
IDU Unique identity of U
PWU Unique password of U
EX Symmetric key encryption using key X
x Secret value (master key) of S
h(·) A collision resistant one-way hash function
⊕ XOR
|| String concatenation operation
3 Review of Wei et al.’s Scheme
In Wei et al.’s scheme [16], the remote telecare server is responsible for generating global
parameters, computing users secret information and providing smart cards to the new
users. There are four phases in their scheme:
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1.) Initial Phase
2.) Registration phase
3.) Authentication phae
4.) Password change phase
3.1 Initial Phase
Initially, the telecare server defines its parameters. It chooses two large primes p and q
such that p = 2q+1. It also selects a generator g of Z∗q and the system master key x ∈ Z∗q .
It defines a one-way hash function h(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
3.2 Registration Phase
To access the telecare services, a patient registers with the server and achieves the per-
sonalized smart card as follows:
Step 1. U generates a random number N , selects the identity IDU and password PWU
and computes W = h(PWU ‖ N). Then U sends IDU and W to S.
Step 2. Upon receiving IDU with W , S calculates B = h(ID
x
U)+h(W ) (mod p). Then,
S embeds h(·), g, p, IDU and B into the smart card and provides it to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, U stores N into the smart card.
3.3 Authentication Phase
When a legal user wishes to login into TMIS, the following steps are executed.
Step 1. U inserts the smart card into a card reader and inputs PWU . Then, SC
generates a random number rU , computes A = g
rU (mod p), W = h(PWU ‖
N), B
′
= (B − h(W ))*A and h1 = h(A ‖ B′ ‖ IDU). Then, U sends the mes-
sage M1 = {IDU , B′, h1} to the server S.
Step 2. Upon receiving the message, S verifies the validity of IDU . If IDU is invalid,
S terminates the session. Otherwise, S calculates A
′
= B
′
h(IDx)
(mod p) and verifies
h1 =? h(A ‖ B′ ‖ IDU). If verification does not hold, S stops the session. Otherwise,
it generates a random number rS and calculates sk = h(IDU ‖ A′ ‖ B′ ‖ rS) and
h2 = h(sk ‖ rS). Then, S sends the message M2 = {h2, rS} to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving the message M2, SC calculates sk
′ = h(IDU ‖ A ‖ B′ ‖ rS) and
verifies h2 =? h(sk
′ ‖ rS). If verification fails, it stops the session. Otherwise, SC
computes h3 = h(IDU ‖ sk′) and sends M3 = {h3} to S.
Step 4. Upon receiving M3, S verifies h3 =? h(IDU ‖ sk). If verification fails, S stops
the session. Otherwise, U is authenticated.
4
3.4 Password Change Phase
Any legal user U can change the password by using the following steps.
Step 1. U inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs the old password PWU
and the new password PWnew.
Step 2. The smart card computes W = h(PWU ‖ N),Wnew = h(PWnew ‖ N) and
Bnew = B − h(W ) + h(Wnew) (mod p).
Step 3. Finally , the smart card replaces B with Bnew.
4 Analysis of Wei et al.’s Scheme
In 2012, Zhu’s [21] demonstrated that Wei et al.’s scheme does not resist offline password
guessing attack. We revisits the Wei et al.’s scheme and find some more flaws. In this
section, we show that Wei et al.’s scheme does not provide efficient login and password
change phase.
4.1 Inefficient password change phase
An efficient smart card based remote user authentication scheme should ensure efficient
password change phase where incorrect input can be quickly detected and user can change
his password without server assistance. However, in Wei et al.’s scheme, if a user inputs
wrong old password, the smart card does not verify the correctness of password and
executes the password change phase. Although a user may enter a wrong password, as
human may sometime forgot the password or commit some mistake. This may cause the
denial of service where a user will no longer communicate with server using the same
smart card. If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U instead of PWU , then the smart card
executes the password change phase as follows:
• Compute W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ||N) and then
B1 = B − h(W ∗)
= h(IDxU) + h(h(PWU ||N))− h(h(PW ∗U ||N)) 6= h(IDxU),
as PW ∗U 6= PWU .
• Compute
Bnew = B1 + h(h(PWnew||N))
= h(IDxU) + h(h(PWU ||N))− h(h(PW ∗U ||N)) + h(h(PWnew||N)).
• Replace B with Bnew.
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The smart card inability of wrong password detection, may cause denial of service
as follows:
• U inputs the current password PWnew into smart card. Then, SC generates a ran-
dom number rU , computes A = g
rE (mod p), Wnew = h(PWnew||N), then achieves
B′new as follows:
B′new = (Bnew − h(Wnew||N)) ∗ A
= (h(IDxU) + h(h(PWU ||N))− h(h(PW ∗U ||N))) ∗ A.
• SC also computes h1 = h(A ‖ B′new ‖ IDU). Then, it sends the message M1 =
{IDU , B′new, h1} to the server S.
• Upon receiving the message, S verifies the validity of IDU . The verification holds, as
message includes user’s original identity. Then, S calculates A
′
= B
′
new
h(IDx)
(mod p) 6=
A, as B′new = (h(ID
x
U)+h(h(PWU ||N))−h(h(PW ∗U ||N)))∗A instead of (h(IDxU))∗A
where PWU 6= PW ∗U .
• S verifies h1 =? h(A′ ‖ B′new ‖ IDU). The verification does not hold, as A′ 6= A.
Then, S terminates the session, as message authentication fails.
In this case, user can never login to the server using the same smart card, which causes
denial of service attack.
4.2 Inefficient login phase:
An efficient smart card based remote user authentication scheme should be able to identify
incorrect login request so that extra communication and computation cost should not
occur due to incorrect login. However, Wei et al.’s scheme does not verify the correctness
of input and executes the session. If a user inputs incorrect input, then the following cases
are possible:
Case 1. If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U instead of PWU :
• SC generates a random number rU , computes A = grU (mod p),W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ‖ N)
and B′∗ = (B − h(W ∗)) ∗A as
(B − h(W ∗)) ∗ A = (h(IDxU) + h(h(PWU ||N))− h(h(PW ∗U ||N))) ∗ A
6= h(IDxU) ∗ A, asPW ∗U 6= PWU
Then, it sends the messageM1 = {IDU , B′∗, h∗1} to S, where h∗1 = h(A ‖ B′∗ ‖ IDU).
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• Upon receiving the message, S verifies the validity of IDU . The verification holds, as
message includes user’s original identity. Then, S calculates A′ = B
′∗
h(IDx)
(mod p) 6=
A, as B′∗ = (h(IDxU)+h(h(PWU ||N))−h(h(PW ∗U ||N))) ∗A instead of h(IDxU) ∗A.
• When S verifies h∗1 =? h(A′ ‖ B′∗ ‖ IDU). The verification does not hold, since
A 6= A′. Then S terminates the session as message authentication does not hold.
Case 2. An attacker can also intercept and modify the login message:
• An attacker intercepts U ’s login message M1 = {IDU , B′, h1}, then selects a num-
ber rE and computes B
′∗ = B′rE. Finally, E replace M1 with M
∗
1 , where M
∗
1 =
{IDU , B′∗, h1}.
• On receiving the message M∗1 , when S verifies h1 =? h(A′ ‖ B′∗ ‖ IDU). The
verification fails because B′∗ = B′ ∗ rE instead of B′. As a result, S terminates the
session.
In both the cases, wrong password input and message impersonation attack, session
terminates. And, user may not identify the correct reason of session failure.
5 Review of Zhu’s Scheme
In 2012, Zhu [21] proposed an improvement of Wei el al.’s [16]. Zhu’s scheme comprises
four phases similar to the Wei et al.’s scheme. The brief description of Zhu’s scheme is as
follows:
5.1 Initial Phase
The remote telecare server S executes the following steps to initiate the session:
Step 1. S generates two large primes p and q and computes n = pq.
Step 2. S chooses a prime number e and an integer d as system public and private keys
such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p−1)(q−1)) and a one-way hash function h(·) : {0}∗ → Z∗q ,
where e and d should be provided to the server in a safe way.
5.2 Registration Phase
Registration phase carries out the following steps:
Step 1. U generates a random number N , selects his identity IDU and password PWU
and computes W = h(PWU ‖ N). Then U sends IDU and W to the telecare server
S.
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Step 2. Upon receiving the registration request, S computes B = h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(W ).
Then, S stores n, e, IDU and B into U ’s smart card and issue the smart card to U .
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, U stores N into the smart card. Finally, the
smart card includes the following security parameters {n, e, IDU , B,N}.
5.3 Authentication Phase
User and server can verify the authenticity of each other by adopting the following pro-
cedure:
Step 1. U inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs PWU . Then SC generates
a random number rU , computesW = h(PWU ‖ N), B′ = B⊕h(W ), h1 = h(B′ ‖ rU)
and X = (h1 ‖ rU)e (mod n). Finally, U sends the message M1 = {IDU , X} to the
server S.
Step 2. Upon receiving M1, S checks the validity of IDU . If IDU is not valid, S
terminates the session. Otherwise, S achieves h′1 ‖ rU = Xd (mod n) and verifies
h
′
1 = h(h(IDU ⊕ d) ‖ r′U). If it does not hold, S terminates the session. Otherwise,
runs Step 3.
Step 3. S generates a random number rU , calculates h2 = h(IDU , r
′
U , rS) and transmits
M2 = {h2, rS} to S.
Step 4. Upon receiving the messageM2, SC verifies h2 =? h(IDU , rU , rS). If verification
does not hold, the smart card terminates the session. Otherwise, it calculates h3 =
h(IDU , rS, rU) and sends the message M3 = {h3} to S.
Step 4. Upon receiving M3, S verifies h3 =? h(IDU , rS, r
′
U). If verification fails, S ter-
minates the session. Otherwise, U is authenticated.
5.4 Password Change Phase
Any legal user with valid smart card can change the password as follows:
Step 1. U inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs the old password PWU
and the new password PWnew.
Step 2. SC computes W = h(PWU ‖ N),Wnew = h(PWnew ‖ N) and Bnew = B ⊕
h(W )⊕ h(Wnew). Finally, it replaces B with Bnew.
6 Analysis of Zhu’s Scheme
In 2013, Lee and Liu [8] demonstrated parallel session attack on Zhu’s Scheme [21]. In
this section, we will show that Zhu’s scheme fails to provide efficient login and password
change phase.
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6.1 Inefficient password change phase
User can change his password independently without server’s assistance. However, the
smart card does not verify the user’s password. If user inputs wrong password PW ∗
instead of PW , then the smart card executes the password change phase as follows:
• Compute W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ‖ N) and then B∗ as:
B∗ = B ⊕ h(W ∗)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)
6= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N), as PWU 6= PW ∗U .
• Replace B with B∗.
The password change phase succeeds, in case of wrong password input. This may cause
denial of service, which is clear from the following facts:
• U inputs PWnew into smart card. Then, smart card generates a random number rU
and computes W = h(PWnew ‖ N), then H∗ as follows:
H∗ = B∗ ⊕ h(Wnew)
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)
6= h(IDU ⊕ d) = H, as PWU 6= PW ∗U
Then, it achieves h∗1 = h(H
∗||rU), X∗ = (h∗1||rU)e (mod n), and sends M∗1 =
{IDU , X∗} to S.
• Upon receiving M∗1 , S achieves h∗1||rU = X∗d (mod n) and then verifies the validity
of IDU . The verification holds. However, when it computes H = h(IDU ⊕ d)) and
checks h∗1 = h(H||rU). The verification does not hold, as H 6= H∗.
• S terminates the session as message authentication fails.
This is denial of service condition.
6.2 Inefficient login phase:
A user may input wrong password in login phase, as a human may commit mistake.
However, in Zhu’s scheme, the smart card executes the session in case of wrong password
inputs.
Case 1. If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U , then smart card executes the login phase
without verifying the correctness of password as follows:
9
• The smart card generates a random number rU and computes W = h(PW ∗U ‖ N),
then H∗ as follows:
H∗ = B ⊕W ∗
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)
6= h(IDU ⊕ d) = H, as PWU 6= PW ∗U
Then, it achieves h∗1 = h(H
∗||rU), X∗ = (h∗1||rU)e (mod n), and sends M∗1 =
{IDU , X∗} to S.
• Upon receiving M∗1 , S achieves h∗1||rU = X∗d (mod n) and then verifies the validity
of IDU . The verification holds. However, when it computes H = h(IDU ⊕ d)) and
checks h∗1 = h(H||rU). The verification does not hold, as H 6= H∗.
• S terminates the session as message authentication fails.
7 Review of Lee and Liu’s Scheme
Lee and Liu [8] presented the enhanced authentication scheme based on the scheme of
Zhu’s scheme [21] to eliminates the weaknesses of Zhu’s scheme. This scheme comprises
of initial phase, registration, authentication and key agreement and password change
phase. Since the initialization phase is same as Zhu’s scheme. So, we only briefly discuss
registration, authentication and key agreement and password change phase, which is as
follows:
7.1 Initial Phase
This phase is similar to the Zhu’s scheme [21].
7.2 Registration Phase
This phase is also similar to the Zhu’s scheme, the only difference is that the smart card
stores one more parameter a serial number SNU = 0. Finally, the smart card stores the
values {n, e, IDU , B,N, SNU}.
7.3 Authentication Phase
To verify the authenticity of each other the server and user perform the following steps:
Step 1. U inserts the smart card into a card reader and inputs his password PWU .
Then, SC generates a random number rU , computes W = h(PWU ||N), SNU =
SNU+1, H = B ⊕W,h1 = h(H||rU ||SNU), X = (IDU ||h1||rU ||SNU)e (mod n), and
sends M1 = {X} to S.
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Step 2. Upon receiving M1, S achieves IDU ||h′1||r′U ||SN ′U = Xd (mod n) and then
verifies the validity of IDU and check SN
′
U > SN , h
′
1 = h(h(IDU ⊕ d)||r′U ||SN ′U),
where SN is initialized as 0 and stores in S database. If verification does not hold,
terminates the session. otherwise, S generates a random number rS and computes
h2 = h(IDU ||r′U ||rS||SN ′U) and sends M2 =< h2, rS ⊕ r′U > to U . S also updates
SN with SN
′
U and keeps it until this session is completed.
Step 3. Upon receivingM2, U achieves r
′
S = rS⊕r′U⊕rU and verifies h2 =? h(IDU ||rU ||r′S||SNU).
If verification fails, U stops the session. Otherwise, U calculates sk = h(IDU ||r′S||rU ||SNU)
and h3 = h(SK), then sends M3 =< h3 > to S.
Step 4. Upon receiving M3, S computes sk
′
= h(IDU ||rS||r′U ||SN ′U) and verifies h3 =
? h(sk
′
). If verification fails, S stops the session. Otherwise, S consider U as
authorized user and sk = sk
′
as the session key.
7.4 Password Change Phase
A user U with valid smart card a correct password can change the password as follows:
Step 1. U insert the smart in the card reader with old password PWU and new password
PWnew.
Step 2. The smart card computes W = h(PWU ‖ N),Wnew = h(PWnew ‖ N) and
Bnew = B ⊕W ⊕Wnew.
Step 3. The smart card replaces B with Bnew .
8 Analysis of Lee and Liu’s Scheme
8.1 Inefficient login phase:
In Lee and Liu’s scheme, the smart card executes the session without verifying the cor-
rectness of input. If a user inputs wrong password PW ∗U , then smart card executes the
login phase without verifying the correctness of password as follows:
• The smart card generates a random number rU and computes W = h(PW ∗U ‖ N),
then H∗ as follows:
H∗ = B ⊕W ∗
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)
6= h(IDU ⊕ d) = H, as PWU 6= PW ∗U
Then, it achieves h∗1 = h(H
∗||rU ||SNU), X∗ = (IDU ||h∗1||rU ||SNU)e (mod n), and
sends M∗1 = {X∗} to S.
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• Upon receiving M∗1 , S achieves IDU ||h∗1||rU ||SNU = X∗d (mod n) and then verifies
the validity of IDU and check SN
′
U > SN . The verification holds. However, when
it computes H = h(IDU ⊕ d)) and checks h∗1 = h(H||rU ||SNU). The verification
does not hold, as H 6= H∗.
• S terminates the session as message authentication fails.
If a user will try again and again by inputting the wrong password. However, the
increase number trials would flood up the network with fake requests. Additionally, it
will also cause the server to indulge in unnecessary calculations causing wastage of time
and resources.
8.2 Inefficient password change phase
In Lee and Liu’s scheme, the user can change his password independently without server’s
assistance. However, the smart card does not verifies the user’s password password. When
a user inputs the wrong password, the Smart card does not verifies the correctness of
password and process the password chance request. However, a user may enter a wrong
password, as human may sometime forgot the password or commit some mistake. This
may cause the denial of service scenario where a user will no longer communicate with
server using the same smart card. If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U instead of PWU ,
then the password change phase works as follows:
• Compute W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ‖ N) and then B∗ = B ⊕W ∗ ⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N) = h(IDU ⊕
d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N) 6= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)
as PWU 6= PW ∗U .
• Replace B with B∗.
The password change phase succeeds, in case of wrong password input. This may cause
denial of service attack, which is clear from the following facts:
• When U inputs new password PWnew into smart card for login. Then, smart card
generates a random number rU and computes Wnew = h(PWnew ‖ N), then H∗ as
follows:
H∗ = B∗ ⊕Wnew
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)⊕ h(PWnew ‖ N)
= h(IDU ⊕ d)⊕ h(PWU ‖ N)⊕ h(PW ∗U ‖ N)
6= h(IDU ⊕ d) = H, as PWU 6= PW ∗U
Then, it achieves h∗1 = h(H
∗||rU ||SNU), X∗ = (IDU ||h∗1||rU ||SNU)e (mod n), and
sends M∗1 = {X∗} to S.
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• Upon receiving M∗1 , S achieves IDU ||h∗1||rU ||SNU = X∗d (mod n) and then verifies
the validity of IDU and check SN
′
U > SN . The verification holds. However, when
it computes H = h(IDU ⊕ d)) and checks h∗1 = h(H||rU ||SNU). The verification
does not hold, as H 6= H∗.
• S terminates the session as message authentication fails.
In this case, user can never login to the server. This shows that denial of service attack
succeeds if user inputs wrong password in password change phase.
9 Review of Lin’s Dynamic ID-based Authentication
Scheme for Telecare Medical Information Systems
In 2013, Lin [10] proposed an improvement of Chen el al.’s dynamic ID-based authentica-
tion scheme for TMIS [3]. Their scheme is motivated by Zhu’s scheme [21] and based on
RSA public-key cryptosystem [15]. In their scheme, medical server S chooses two large
primes p and q then computes N = pq. S also chooses an integer e which is relatively
prime to (p− 1)(q− 1) and derives d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q− 1)). Lin’s scheme
consists registration, login, verification and password change chases which is similar to
Chen et al.’s scheme. The brief description of registration, login, verification and password
change phases are given below:
9.1 Registration Phase
A user U registers his identity IDU to the medical server S and gets the medical smart
card SC with personalized security parameters as follows:
Step 1. User U selects a password and an integer t ∈ ZN . U computes W = h(PWU ⊕ t)
and sends the message < IDU ,W > to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving U ’s message < IDU ,W >, S computes v = W ⊕ h(d ⊕ IDU).
Then S personalizes U ’s medical smart card by embedding the parameters {N, v, e}
and returns the medical smart card to U via secure channel.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, U stores t into the smart card, i.e., smart card
stores {N, v, e, t}.
9.2 Login Phase
The user U inserts his smart card SC into the smart card reader, and inputs IDU and
PWU . SC chooses k ∈ ZN and computes W = h(PWU ⊕ t), H = v ⊕ W , CID =
h(H ⊕ k), R = h(CID, k, IDU , T1) and X = (CID||k||IDU)e mod N where T1 is the
current timestamp. Finally, the message < X,R, T1 > is sent to S.
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9.3 Verification Phase
In verification phase, user U and medical server S verify the authenticate each other and
compute session key as follows:
Step 1. Upon receiving U ’s message < X,R, T1 >, S verifies T2−T1 ≤ ∆t where T2 is the
message receiving time. If time delay in message transmission is invalid, S denies
the request. Otherwise, S computes Xd mod N = (CID||k||IDU), H = h(d⊕IDU )
and R = h(h(H ⊕ k), k, IDU , T1).
Step 2. Server S checks CID
?
= h(H ⊕ k) and R ?= R′. If the verification does not
hold, S terminates the session. Otherwise, S computes λ = h(H,CID,R, T1, T2)
and V = h(λ,H, T1, T2) then responds with message < V, T2 > to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving the message < V, T2 >, SC verifies T3−T4 ≤ ∆t. If the verifica-
tion fails, SC terminates the session. Otherwise, SC computes λ′ = h(H,CID,R, T1, T2)
and V ′ = h(λ′, H, T1, T2). Then SC verifies V
?
= V ′. If condition holds, the verifi-
cation is succeeded. Moreover, U and S consider λ as the session key.
9.4 Password Change Phase
Any legal user U can change the password by adopting the following steps.
Step 1. The user U inputs his current password PWU and new password PWnew.
Step 2. The smart card SC computes vnew = v⊕h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ (PWnew⊕ t) and replace
v with vnew.
10 Analysis of Lin’s Scheme
This section demonstrates the inefficiency of Lin’s scheme login and password change
phase and their consequences.
10.1 Inefficient password change phase
If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U instead of PWU , then the smart card executes the
password change phase as follows:
• Compute W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ⊕ t) and then v∗ = v ⊕W ∗ ⊕ h(PWnew ⊕ t) = h(PWU ⊕
t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)⊕ h(PWnew ⊕ t).
• Replace v with v∗, where v∗ 6= h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PWnew ⊕ t), as PW ∗U 6= PWU .
The smart card inability of wrong password detection, may cause denial of service
attack, which is clear from the following facts:
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• U inputs IDU and PWnew into smart card. Then, smart card chooses k ∈ ZN and
computes W = h(PWnew ⊕ t), then H∗ is computed as:
H∗ = v∗ ⊕W
= h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)⊕ h(PWnew ⊕ t)⊕ h(PWnew ⊕ t)
= h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t) 6= h(PWU ⊕ t)
It also computes CID∗ = h(H∗ ⊕ k), R∗ = h(CID∗, k, IDU , T1), and
X∗ = (CID∗||k||IDU)e mod N , where T1 is the current time stamp. Finally, it
sends the login message < X∗, R∗, T1 > to S.
• Upon receiving U ’s message at time T2, S verifies T2 − T1 ≤ ∆t. The validation
holds, as the message is originally sent by user. Then, S computes Xd mod N =
(CID∗||k||IDU), H = h(d⊕ IDU), R = h(h(H ⊕ k), k, IDU , T1).
• S verifies CID∗ =? h(H ⊕ k) and R =?R∗. The verification fails, since CID∗ =
h(h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕h(d⊕IDU)⊕h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)⊕k) as PW ∗U 6= PWU . Moreover, R 6= R∗
as H∗ 6= h(d⊕ IDU).
• S terminates the session as message authentication fails.
In this case, user can never login into the server because of denial of service scenario for
legal user.
10.2 Inefficient login phase:
An efficient smart card based remote user authentication scheme should be able to identify
incorrect login request so that extra communication and computation cost should not
occur due to incorrect login. However, in Lin’s scheme, the smart card does not verify the
correctness of input. And, if a patient inputs incorrect identity or password, the smart
card executes the login session. In this case, the following cases are possible:
Case 1. If user inputs correct identity IDU and incorrect password PW
∗
U . Then without
verifying the input, the smart card executes the login phase as follows:
− The smart card chooses k ∈ ZN and computes W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ⊕ t), then H∗ as:
H∗ = v ⊕W ∗
= h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)
U also computes CID∗ = h(H∗ ⊕ k), R∗ = h(CID∗, k, IDU , T1) and
X∗ = (CID∗||k||IDU)e mod N , where T1 is the current time stamp. Finally, it
sends the login message < X∗, R∗, T1 > to S.
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− Upon receiving the message, S verifies T2−T1 ≤ ∆t, where T2 is S’s message receiv-
ing time. If time delay in message transmission is valid, S computes (X∗)d mod N =
(CID∗||k||IDU), H = h(d⊕ IDU), R = h(h(H ⊕ k), k, IDU , T1).
− S verifies CID∗ =?h(H ⊕ k) and R =?R∗. The verification fails, since H∗ =
h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d ⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t) instead of h(d ⊕ IDU) as PW ∗U 6= PWU .
Moreover, R 6= R∗, as H∗ 6= h(d⊕ IDU).
− S terminates the session, as message authentication does not hold.
Case 2. If a user inputs incorrect identity IDU and correct password PWU . However,
the smart card does not verify the correctness of input identity and executes the session,
which works as follows:
− Smart card chooses k ∈ ZN . It computes W = h(PWU ⊕ t), H = v ⊕W , CID =
h(H ⊕ k), R∗ = h(CID, k, ID∗U , T1) and X∗ = (CID||k||ID∗U)e mod N , where T1 is
the current time stamp. Finally, it sends login message < X∗, R∗, T1 > to S.
− Upon receiving the message < X∗, R∗, T1 >, S verifies T2−T1 ≤ ∆t, where T2 is the
message receiving time. If time delay in message transmission is valid, S computes
Xdmod N = (CID||k||ID∗U), H ′ = h(d⊕ ID∗U), R′ = h(h(H ′ ⊕ k), k, ID∗U , T1).
− When, S verifies CID =?h(H ′ ⊕ k), the verification does not hold, since H =
h(d ⊕ IDU) while H ′ = h(d ⊕ ID∗U) where ID∗U 6= IDU . Moreover, the condition
R =?R′ is not satisfied.
− Finally, S terminates the session.
Case 3. If User inputs incorrect identity and password, then also the smart card executes
the login session as follows:
− The smart card chooses k ∈ ZN and computes W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ⊕ t), then H∗ as:
H∗ = v ⊕W ∗
= h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)
= h(PWU ⊕ t)⊕ h(d⊕ IDU)⊕ h(PW ∗U ⊕ t)
U also computes CID∗ = h(H∗ ⊕ k), R∗ = h(CID∗, k, ID∗U , T1) and
X∗ = (CID∗||k||ID∗U)e mod N , where T1 is the current time stamp. Finally, U
sends the login message < X∗, R∗, T1 > to S.
− Upon receiving the message, S verifies T2−T1 ≤ ∆t, where T2 is the message receiv-
ing time. If time delay in message transmission is valid, S computes (X∗)d mod N =
(CID∗||k||ID∗U), H ′ = h(d⊕ ID∗U), R′ = h(h(H ′ ⊕ k), k, ID∗U , T1).
16
− S verifies CID∗ =?h(H ′ ⊕ k), the verification fails because H∗ = h(PWU ⊕ t) ⊕
h(d⊕ IDU)⊕h(PW ∗U ⊕ t) while H ′ = h(d⊕ ID∗U). Moreover, R =?R∗ also does not
hold. So, the verification fails.
− S terminates the session, as message verification does not hold.
Case 4. An attacker can also intercept and modify the login message, which is justified
as follows:
− An attacker intercepts U ’s login message < X,R, T1 >.
− Replace the message with < X,R∗, T1 >, where R∗ = h(R||T1).
− On receiving the message, when S verifies R =?R∗. The verification fails because
R = h(h(H ⊕ k), k, IDU , T1) while R∗ = h(R||T1). Thus, S terminates the session.
In both the cases, wrong password input and message impersonation attack, session
terminates. And, user may not identify the correct reason of session failure.
11 Review of Cao and Zhai’s Scheme
In 2013, Cao et al. [2] proposed an improvement of Chen el al.’s dynamic ID-based au-
thentication scheme for telecare medical information systems [3]. In their scheme, the
server initially chooses two large prime numbers p and q, where p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and q ≡ 3
(mod 4). The server keeps p and q secret and makes n = pq public. The Cao and Zhai’s
Scheme comprises the following phases:
− (i) Registration.
− (ii) Authentication and key agreement.
− (iii) Password change
− (iv) Lost smart card revocation
11.1 Registration Phase
Step 1. U selects an appropriate identity IDU , password PWU and chooses a random
number b. Then, he calculates W = h(b||PWU) and submits {IDU ,W} to S.
Step 2. S verifies IDU and the user account database. If the patient is unregistered, S
stores IDU and N = 0 into the U ’s account database.
Step 3. S calculates J = h(p||q||IDU ||N) and L = J ⊕ W . Finally, it embeds the
parameters (L, n, h(·)) into smart card and issues the smart card to U .
Step 4. Upon receiving the smart card, U stores b into the smart card.
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11.2 Authentication and key agreement phase
U inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs his identity and password to
execute the login.
Step 1. SC chooses a random number ru and calculates J = L⊕h(b||PWU) and AID =
(IDU ||J ||ru)2 (mod n). Then, it sends the login message {AID} to S.
Step 2. Upon receiving the login message, S decrypts {AID} using its private keys p
and q and get (ID
′
U ||J ′||r′). S verifies the validity of ID′U . If verification holds,
S extracts the corresponding value N from its database. Then, it achieves J =
h(p||q||ID′U ||N) and verifies J =? J ′ . If verification holds, S chooses a random
number rs and computes Ks = h(ru||rs) and Cs = h(Ks||rs). Finally, it sends
{rs, Cs} to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving {rs, Cs}, U achieves Ku = h(ru||rs) and verifies Cs =? h(Ku||rs).
If condition does not hold, U terminates the session. On the contrary, U identifies
Ku as the session key and sends Cu = h(rs||Ku) to S.
Step 4. Upon receiving Cu, S verifies Cu =? h(rs||Ks). If condition does not hold, S
stops the session. On the contrary, S decides Ks as the session key.
11.3 Password Change Phase
A legal user U can change the password by inputting the identity IDU , the old password
PWU and the new password PWnew as follows.
Step 1 This step follows Step 1 & 2 of Authentication and key agreement phase.
Step 2. Upon achieving {rs, Cs}, U computesKu = h(ru||rs) and verifies Cs =? h(Ku||rs).
If condition does not hold, SC terminates the session. Otherwise, it computes
Lnew = L⊕ h(b||PWU)⊕ h(b||PWnew) and updates L with Lnew.
11.4 Lost Smart Card Revocation
If a legal user lost his smart card, he can achieve a new smart card from server as follows:
Step 1. U selects a password PWU and a random number b. U computes W =
h(b||PWU) and sends {IDU ,W} to S.
Step 2. Let N = N +1, then S achieves J = h(p||q||IDU ||N) and L = J ⊕W . Finally,
S embeds (L, n, h(·)) into the smart card and issues the card to U while U stores b
into the smart card.
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12 Analysis of Cao and Zhai’s Scheme
In this section, we will show that Cao and Zhai’s [2] scheme does not provide efficient
login and user-friendly password change phase. Additionally, the scheme is vulnerable to
known session specific temporary information attack and replay attack.
12.1 Inefficient login phase:
A smart card based authentication scheme should be able to detect incorrect login so that
unnecessary computation can be avoided [4]. However, Cao and Zhai’s scheme, smart card
do not verify the correctness of input parameters (identity and password). A user can
input wrong input, as human may forget or use one account identity into another account
or by mistake he may enter a wrong input. In case of incorrect login (wrong identity and
password input), smart card executes the session in Cao and Zhai’s scheme. Then, the
following cases take place:
Case 1. If a user inputs the correct identity and wrong password, then login session
executes as follows:
− U inputs correct identity IDU and wrong password PW ∗U into the smart card. With-
out verifying the correctness of input parameters, the smart card selects a random
number ru and achieves J
∗ = L ⊕ h(b||PW ∗U) = h(p||q||IDU ||N) ⊕ h(b||PWU) ⊕
h(b||PW ∗U).
− Smart card also computes AID∗ = (IDU ||J∗||ru)2 (mod n), then sends the login
message < AID∗ > to S.
− Upon receiving the message< AID∗ >, S decrypts AID∗ and achieves (IDU ||J∗||ru).
S verifies the correctness of IDU . The verification holds, as IDU is correctly entered.
Then S retrieves the corresponding value N . It computes J = h(p||q||IDU ||N) and
verifies J =? J∗.
− The verification does not hold, since J∗ = h(p||q||IDU ||N)⊕h(b||PWU)⊕h(b||PW ∗U).
Then, S terminates the session.
Case 2. If the user enters incorrect identity and correct password. In this case, there are
two possibilities:
1. Input incorrect identity may match with some other legitimate user identity, as a
mistaken identity can be the legitimate identity of any valid user.
2. Input incorrect identity may not match with any user identity.
Case 2.1. When user U inputs incorrect identity ID∗U and correct password PWU into
the smart card. If incorrect identity matches with some legitimate user identity in the
system the process executes as follows:
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− Without verifying the correctness of input parameters, the smart card selects a ran-
dom number ru and achieves J = L⊕h(b||PWU ) = h(p||q||IDU ||N)⊕h(b||PWU)⊕
h(b||PWU) = h(p||q||IDU ||N).
− Smart card also computes AID∗ = (ID∗U ||J ||ru)2 (mod n), then sends the login
message < AID∗ > to S.
− Upon receiving the message < AID∗ >, S decrypts AID∗ and achieves (ID∗U ||J ||ru).
S verifies the correctness of IDU . If ID
∗
U matches with some legitimate user identity,
the verification holds. Then, S retrieves the corresponding value N∗ and computes
J∗ = h(p||q||ID∗U ||N∗) and verifies J =? J∗. The verification does not hold, as
IDU 6= ID∗U . So, S terminates the session.
Case 2.2. If input incorrect identity does not match with any legitimate user identity.
− U inputs incorrect identity ID∗U into the smart card. Then, the smart card se-
lects a random number ru and achieves J = L ⊕ h(b||PWU) = h(p||q||IDU ||N) ⊕
h(b||PWU)⊕ h(b||PWU) = h(p||q||IDU ||N).
− Smart card also computes AID∗ = (ID∗U ||J ||ru)2 (mod n), then sends the login
message < AID∗ > to S.
− Upon receiving the message < AID∗ >, S decrypts AID∗ and achieves (ID∗U ||J ||ru).
S verifies the correctness of ID∗U . The verification does not hold, as the identity
does not match with any legitimate user identity.
Case 3. If both input parameters (identity and password) are incorrect, then Case 1 or
Case 2.2 will repeat.
12.2 Unfriendly password change phase
A user should be allowed to change the password without server assistance [9]. However,
in Cao and Zhai’s scheme, a user cannot change the password independently without
server’s assistance. To change the password, the user has to communicate with the server
each time. This makes the password change phase unfriendly.
13 Review of Xie et al.’s Scheme
In 2013, Xie et al. [10] proposed an improvement of Chen el al.’s dynamic ID-based
authentication scheme for telecare medical information systems [3]. Their scheme is based
on RSA public-key cryptosystem [15]. In which, the medical server S chooses two large
primes p and q, then computes n = pq. It also chooses an integer e, which is relatively
prime to (p − 1)(q − 1) and derives X such that eX ≡ 1 (mod ()p − 1)(q − 1). Xie et
al.’s scheme also has the similar phases as Cao and Zhai’s scheme. Xie et al.’s Scheme
comprises the following phases:
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(i) Registration.
(ii) Login.
(iii) Verification.
(iv) Password change.
(iv) Smart card revocation.
13.1 Registration Phase
A patient can registers his identity with the server and gets the smart card as follows:
Step 1. U selects his identity IDU and password PWU , then submits IDU with registra-
tion request to the medical server.
Step 2. Upon receiving the U ’s message, S checks the legitimacy of IDU . If this is
invalid, it terminates the session. Otherwise, it assigns a card number SC, then
computes J = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC). It also keeps the account table, which includes
(IDU , RID) = (IDU , EX(IDU ,
N, SC)) to maintain the record of patient registration identity IDU , card number
SC, registration time N (If patient is newly registered N=0, otherwise, N = N+1).
Step 3. S embeds the values {IDU , SC,N, J, n, e, h(·)} into the smart card and then
returns the medical smart card to U via secure channel.
Step 3. U computes L = J ⊕ h(PWU) and then replace J with L.
13.2 Login Phase
When a patient wishes to login into TMIS server, he inserts his smart card into the card
reader, then login session executes as follows:
Step 1. The smart card generates a random number a and achieves J = L⊕h(PWU ), A =
Ja (mod n), C1 = h(Tu||J ||A) and AID = (IDU ||N ||SC||C1||A)e (mod n), where
Tu is the current timestamp.
Step 2. Smart card sends the login message < AID, Tu > to S.
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13.3 Verification Phase
Smart card and server performs the following steps to authenticate each other:
Step 1. Upon receiving the message < AID, Tu > at time T , S Verify T − Tu ≤ ∆t,
where ∆t is the valid time delay in message transmission. If time delay is invalid, ter-
minate the session. Otherwise, S computes AIDX (mod n) = (IDU ||N ||SC||C1||A)
and then J = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC) and C ′1 = h(Tu||J ||A). It also decrypts RID and
achieves (IDU , N, SC).
Step 2. S verifies the validity of IDU , SC and C
′
1. If verification does not hold, ter-
minate the session. Otherwise, S generates a random number b and then computes
B = J b (mod n), C = Ab (mod n) = Jab (mod n) and C2 = h(C1||C||Ts||B).
Finally, S sends the message {C2, Ts, B} to U , where Ts is the current timestamp.
Step 3. Upon receiving S’s message {C2, Ts, B} at time T ′, smart card verifies T ′−Ts ≤
∆t. If verification fails, terminate the session. Otherwise, it computes C = Ba
(mod n) = Jab (mod n) and C ′2 = h(C1||C||Ts||B). Then , it verifies C2 =?C ′2. If
it holds, U computes sk = h(Tu||C||Ts).
13.4 Password Change Phase
Any legal user U can change the password by using the following steps.
Step 1. U inputs his old password PWU and new password PWnew into his smart card.
Step 2. Smart card computes Lnew = L ⊕ h(PWU) ⊕ h(PWnew), then replaces L with
Lnew.
13.5 Smart Card Revocation
If a legal user lost his smart card, then user can get a new smart card from server as
follows:
Step 1. U submits its new smart card request with IDU to S.
Step 2. S verifies the validity of U ’s ID card. Then, server adopts the same procedure
as in registration phase. Additionally, it replaces N with N + 1 and then RID =
EX(IDU , N, SC) with RID
′ = EX(IDU , N, SC
′) in account table, where SC ′ is a
new smart card number.
14 Analysis of Xie et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we will show that Xie et al.’s scheme does not provide efficient login and
password change phase.
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14.1 Inefficient login phase:
In Xie et al.’s scheme, smart card does not verify the correctness of input. However, a
human may sometimes input wrong password due to mistake. If user inputs incorrect
password even then the smart card executes the login phase, which is as follows:
− U inputs incorrect password PW ∗U into smart card. Then, the smart card generates a
random number a and achieves J∗ = L⊕h(PW ∗U) = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC)⊕h(PWU)⊕
h(PW ∗U).
− Smart card also computes A∗ = J∗a (mod n), C∗1 = h(Tu||J∗||A∗) and AID∗ =
(IDU ||N ||SC||
C∗1 ||A∗)e (mod n), where Tu is the current time stamp.
− Finally, smart card sends the login message < AID∗, Tu > to S.
− Upon receiving the message < AID∗, Tu > at time T , S verifies T − Tu ≤ ∆t.
The verification succeeds, as Tu is the valid timestamp. Then, S computes AID
∗X
(mod n) = (IDU ||N ||SC||C∗1 ||A∗) and then J = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC) and C1 =
h(Tu||J ||A∗). It also decrypts RID and achieves (IDU , N, SC).
− S verifies the validity of IDU , SC and C1 =?C∗1 . The verification does not hold, as
C1 6= C∗1 since J 6= J∗.
− S terminates the session as message authentication does not hold.
An attacker can track, intercept, and record the messages. Let the attacker has achieved
an previously transmitted message < AID, Tu >. An attacker can also modify and replace
the messages that transmit via public channel.
In case if user inputs correct password. Although, the attacker intercepts the message
< AID, Tu > and replaces with old transmitted message < AID
′, TE > as an attacker
can intercept, modify,record, and replace the message that transmit via public channel,
where AID′ is the old transmitted value and TE is current timestamp. Then, on receiving
the message < AID′, TE >, server performs the following steps:
− S verifies T − TE ≤ ∆t, where T is the message receiving time. The verification
succeeds, as attacker usage its current timestamp.
− S computes AID′X (mod n) = (IDU ||N ||SC||C ′1||A′), where A′ = Ja (mod n) and
C1 = h(T
′
u||J ||A′) for old timestamp T ′u. Then, compute J = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC)
and C1 = h(TE ||J ||A). It also decrypts RID and achieves (IDU , N, SC).
− S verifies the validity of IDU , SC and C1 =? C ′1. The verification of C1 =? C ′1 does
not hold, as T ′E 6= Tu.
− Finally, S terminates the session as message authentication does not hold.
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In case 1, in spite of wrong password the smart card executes the login session. How-
ever, server terminates the session. Moreover, in case of message impersonation attack
(case 2), the server also terminates the session in same step. Therefore, if the session
terminates, it will be difficult for user to identify that exactly why the session has termi-
nated.
14.2 Inefficient password change phase
User can change his password independently without server’s assistance. However, the
smart card does not verify the user’s password. When a user inputs the wrong password,
the smart card does not verify the correctness of password and processes the password
change request. However, a user may enter a wrong password, as human may sometimes
forget the password or commit some mistake. This may cause the denial of service scenario
where a user will no longer communicate with server using the same smart card.
If user inputs wrong password PW ∗U instead of PWU , then the smart card executes the
password change phase as follows:
• Compute h(PW ∗U) and then achieve J∗ = L⊕ h(PW ∗U) = J ⊕ h(PWU)⊕ h(PW ∗U),
as PWU 6= PW ∗U .
• Compute Lnew = J∗ ⊕ h(PWnew) = J ⊕ h(PWU)⊕ h(PW ∗U)⊕ h(PWnew) and then
replace L with Lnew.
The smart card inability of wrong password detection, may cause denial of service
attack, which is clear from the following facts:
• U inputs PWnew into smart card. Then, the smart card generates a random num-
ber a and computes J ′ = Lnew ⊕ h(PWnew) = J ⊕ h(PWU) ⊕ (PW ∗U) 6= J =
h(X||IDU ||N ||SC).
• Smart card also computes A′ = J ′a (mod n), C ′1 = h(Tu||J ′||A′) and AID′ =
(IDU ||N ||SC||C ′1
||A′)e (mod n) with current timestamp Tu. Then, it sends the login message <
AID′, Tu > to S.
• Upon receiving the message < AID′, Tu > at time T , S verifies T − Tu ≤ ∆t,
which holds, as Tu is the valid timestamp. Then, S computes AID
X (mod n) =
(IDU ||N ||SC||C∗1 ||A∗) and then J = h(X||IDU ||N ||SC) and C1 = h(Tu||J ||A′). It
also decrypts RID and achieves (IDU , N, SC).
• S verifies the validity of IDU , SC and C1 =?C∗1 . The verification of C1 =?C∗1 does
not hold, as J 6= J ′. Then, it terminates the session.
The above discussion indicates that user can never login to the server after inputting
the wrong password in password change phase. This causes denial of service attack
for legal user. Moreover, user can not track the mistake, as the message also terminates
because of inefficient login phase.
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15 Review of Xu et al.’s Authentication and Key
Agreement Scheme Based on ECC for Telecare
Medicine Information Systems
In 2014, Xu et al. [20] presented a two-factor authenticated key agreement Scheme based
on ECC for TMIS. Their scheme comprises four phases, namely, registration phase, login
phase, verification phase and password update phase.
Before initiating the registration phase, the server S opts an elliptic curve E : y2 =
x3+ax+b(mod p) and generates a nth order group Ep(a, b) over the prime field Z
∗
p , where
n is a large prime number. S chooses a base point P = (x0, y0) such that n·P = O. S
selects a random number s ∈ Z∗p and compute Y = s·P . S also chooses two one-way hash
functions h(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and h1(· · · ) : Gp ×Gp → Z∗p , where Gp is a additive elliptic
curve group. S keeps s secret.
15.1 Registration Phase
A user U registers his identity IDU to the medical server S and gets the medical smart
card SC with personalized security parameters as follows:
Step 1. User U selects a password PWU and a random number r. U computes W =
h(PWU ||r) and sends the message < IDU ,W > to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving U ’s request, S computes H = h(s⊕ IDU) and B = H ⊕W . S
personalizes U ’s smart card by embedding the parameters {Ep, P, Y, B, h(·), h1(·)},
and sends the smart card to U via secure channel.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, U stores r into the smart card.
15.2 Login Phase
The user U inserts his smart card SC into the card reader, and inputs IDU and PWU .
SC computes W = h(PWU ||r), H = B ⊕W , C1 = a·P , C2 = a·Y , CID = IDU ⊕ h1(C2)
and F = h(IDU ||H||T1) for secret nonce a selected by U and T1 is the current timestamp.
Finally, SC sends the login message < C1, CID, F, T1 > to S.
15.3 Verification Phase
User U and server S verify the authenticate each other and compute session key as follows:
Step 1. Upon receiving the message < C1, CID, F, T1 >, S verifies T1. If T1 is a null
timestamp, S terminates the session. Otherwise, S computes C ′2 = s·C1, ID′U =
CID ⊕ h1(C2) and H ′ = h(s ⊕ ID′U). Then S verifies F ?= h(ID′U ||H ′||T1). If
verification does not hold, the session is terminated. Otherwise, S considers U as a
legitimate user.
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Step 2. Server S chooses a nonce C, and computes D1 = c·P , D2 = c·C1, sk =
h(ID′U ||h1(D2)||H ′) and G = h(sk||H ′||T2) and then responds with message <
D1, G, T2 > to U , where T2 is the current timestamp.
Step 3. Upon receiving the message < D1, G, T2 >, SC verifies the validity of T2. If the
verification holds, SC computes D′2 = a·D1 and sk′ = h(IDU ||h1(D′2)||H). Then
SC verifies G
?
= h(sk′||H||T2). If the verification succeeds, U considers S as an
authorized server. Moreover, U and S consider sk as the session key.
15.4 Password Change Phase
Any user U can change the password by adopting the following steps.
Step 1. U inputs PWU and IDU . Then SC computes W = h(PW ||r) and H = B ⊕W .
Step 2. U is asked to enter a new password PWnew. Upon receiving PWnew, SC com-
putes Wnew = h(PWnew||r) and Bnew = H ⊕Wnew, and replaces B with Bnew.
16 Flaws in Xu et al.’s Scheme
This section demonstrates the inefficiency of login and password change phases of Xu et
al.’s scheme and their disadvantages.
16.1 Inefficient password change phase
Xu et al.’s scheme executes the password change phase without verify the correctness of
input. If a user commits some mistake in entering current password, outcome will be
denial of service attack. The following discussion justified the claim:
• A user U inputs identity IDU and incorrect current password PW ∗U .
• The smart card computes W ∗ = h(PW ∗U ||r) and then H∗ = B ⊕ W ∗ = H ⊕
h(PWU ||r)⊕ h(PW ∗U ||r) 6= H as PW ∗U 6= PWU .
• U inputs a new password PWnew and smart card computes Wnew = h(PWnew||r)
and B∗new = H
∗ ⊕Wnew.
The inability of incorrect input detection, leads to denial of service scenario for an
authorized user as follows:
The user U inserts his smart card SC into the card reader, and inputs IDU and PWU .
SC computes W = h(PWU ||r), H = B ⊕W , C1 = a·P , C2 = a·Y , CID = IDU ⊕ h1(C2)
and F = h(IDU ||H||T1) for secret nonce a and current timestamp T1. Finally, SC sends
the login message < C1, CID, F, T1 > to S.
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• To login, U inputs identity IDU and new changed password PWnew. SC computes
Wnew = h(PWnew||r) and then H∗ = B∗new ⊕Wnew.
• SC also computes C1 = a·P , C2 = a·Y , CID = IDU⊕h1(C2) and F ∗ = h(IDU ||H∗||T1)
for secret nonce a and current timestamp T1. Finally, SC sends the login message
< C1, CID, F
∗, T1 > to S.
• Upon receiving the message < C1, CID, F ∗, T1 >, S verifies T1. The verification
holds as U usage current timestamp. Then S computes C ′2 = s·C1, ID′U = CID ⊕
h1(C2) and H
′ = h(s⊕ID′U). Then S verifies F ∗ ?= h(ID′U ||H ′||T1). The verification
does not hold as H∗ 6= H . The session is terminated.
The above discussion shows that user cannot login to the medical server using the same
smart card due to flaws in password change phase. This shows that inefficient password
change phase can lead to denial of service attack for a legitimate user.
16.2 Inefficient login phase:
Xu et al.’s scheme does not check the correctness of input before executing the login
session. Therefore, the login session can be executed in case of incorrect input. This
causes extra communication and computation overhead which is justified as follows:
Case 1. User U inputs correct identity IDU , but incorrect password PW
∗
U due to mistake.
− SC computesW ∗ = h(PW ∗U ||r) and H∗ = B⊕W ∗ = H⊕h(PWU ||r)⊕h(PW ∗U ||r) 6=
H as PW ∗U 6= PWU
− SC also computes C1 = a·P , C2 = a·Y , CID = IDU⊕h1(C2) and F ∗ = h(IDU ||H∗||T1)
for secret nonce a selected by U and T1 is the current timestamp. SC sends the
login message < C1, CID, F
∗, T1 > to S.
− Upon receiving the message < C1, CID, F ∗, T1 >, S verifies T1. If T1 verification
hold, S computes C ′2 = s·C1, ID′U = CID ⊕ h1(C2) and H ′ = h(s ⊕ ID′U). Then
S verifies F ∗
?
= h(ID′U ||H ′||T1). The verification does not hold as H∗ 6= H ′. The
session is terminated.
Case 2. User U inputs correct password PWU and incorrect identity ID
∗
U by mistake.
− SC computes W = h(PWU ||r), H = B ⊕ W , C1 = a·P , C2 = a·Y , CID =
ID∗U ⊕ h1(C2) and F ′∗ = h(ID∗U ||H||T1) for secret nonce a selected by U and T1 is
the current timestamp. Finally, SC sends the login message < C1, CID
∗, F ∗, T1 >
to S.
− Upon receiving the message < C1, CID, F ′∗, T1 >, S verifies T1. If T1 verification
hold, S computes C ′2 = s·C1, ID∗U = CID∗ ⊕ h1(C2) and H ′∗ = h(s⊕ ID∗U). Then
S verifies F ′∗ =
?
= h(ID∗U ||H ′∗||T1). The verification does not hold as H ′∗ 6= H . The
session is terminated.
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17 Comparison
We compare some of the recently published password based schemes for TMIS [2, 3, 8, 10,
16, 21, 18] in Table 2. If the scheme prevents attack or satisfies the property, the symbol
’
√
’ is used and if it fails to prevent attack or does not satisfy the attribute, the symbol
× is used.
Table 2: Security attributes comparison with some password based schemes for TMIS
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤❤
Security attributes
Schemes
[16] [21] [8] [3] [2] [18] [10] [20]
User anonymity × × √ √ √ √ √ √
Insider Attack
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Replay attack
√ √ √ √ × √ √ √
Session key agreement
√ × √ √ √ √ √ √
Session key verification
√ − √ × √ × × √
Efficient password change × × × √ √ × × ×
User-friendly password change × × × √ × √ √ √
Efficient login × × × √ × × × ×
18 Conclusion
It is clear from the discussion that inefficient login phase increases the number attempts to
login into the server, which would flood up the network with fake requests. As a result, the
server may busy in indulging unnecessary calculations, which may cause wastage of time
and resources. The findings also print out the drawback of inefficient login and password
change phase. The study of login and password phase of authentication schemes for TMIS
shows that a scalable scheme should maintain efficient login and password change phase
to avoid unnecessary trouble.
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